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Abstract 
The paper discusses the management of the New Zealand Crown’s exposure to financial 
risk. It argues that the Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk can be effectively managed 
only centrally, and that, despite the difficulties of measuring risk and specifying an 
appropriate objective, the government should do more to measure, monitor, and control 
the Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk. The paper goes on to present a new model for 
quantifying the Crown’s exposure to risk, which integrates analysis of the government’s 
accounting assets and liabilities with analysis of projected tax revenue and government 
spending. Among other results, the model suggests that the annual volatility (standard 
deviation) of the Crown’s comprehensive balance sheet is at present approximately 
$30 billion. 
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  G32 - Financial Risk and Risk Management 
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government 
KEYWORDS  Risk management; Crown balance sheet 
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Improving the Management of the 
Crown’s Exposure to Risk 
1 Summary 
This paper considers the management of the Crown’s exposure to financial risk. By 
financial risk we mean the variability in the Crown’s net worth under planned policy. By 
managing risk we mean measuring it, analysing it, and, where appropriate, taking steps to 
reduce or otherwise change it. 
It is widely acknowledged that the government should manage the Crown’s exposure to 
risk. The cost to New Zealanders of the Crown becoming financially distressed would 
likely be very high, so keeping that risk very low is important. In addition, there is a case 
for keeping tax rates and spending stable in the face of economic shocks.  
The Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk can be effectively managed only centrally. The 
risk to which the Crown is exposed depends on the size of the risks in each part of the 
Crown’s portfolio and on the correlations among the parts. The managers of the various 
parts of the Crown’s portfolio can estimate and manage the risk in their portfolios, but they 
cannot be expected to know what contribution the risk in their portfolios makes to the 
Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk. But central risk management does not imply 
micromanagement: the management of many assets and liabilities can be delegated, and 
central control of other risks may amount to no more than a direction to avoid or minimise 
certain risks. 
The management of risk is already centralised in several ways. Recent central risk-
management decisions have included avoiding net foreign-currency debt, limiting gross 
debt to 20% of GDP, and suspending contributions to the New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund (NZSF). Yet, the government’s management of the Crown’s exposure to risk is less 
intensive than might be expected. The government does not currently measure the 
Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk. And it allows the managers of financial assets and 
other parts of the Crown’s portfolio to make choices that may have significant effects on 
the Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk. 
Given the inevitable inaccuracy of any estimates of the Crown’s exposure to risk, and the 
difficulty of precisely specifying the Crown’s risk-management goal, the government’s 
existing approach is understandable. Yet it does have disadvantages. In the absence of a 
comprehensive model of the Crown’s exposure to risk, decisions must be based on 
intuition or partial, and therefore inadequate, models. In the absence of central control, 
managers of parts of the Crown’s portfolio may unknowingly expose the Crown to too  
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much risk or incur costs to reduce their own exposure to risk when, from the Crown’s 
perspective, that is unnecessary or even counterproductive. Cheap ways of reducing the 
Crown’s exposure to risk may be overlooked. 
That suggests that the government should measure and monitor the Crown’s exposure to 
risk. Although the government should be prepared to intervene more, if necessary, in risk-
related decisions of the managers of the parts of the Crown’s portfolios, whether it should 
depends of course on the results of the measurement and monitoring and on the possible 
costs of the intervention such as a reduction in the accountability and independence of 
managers. 
Building on work done by the Treasury in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the 
development of consolidated Crown accounts and long-term fiscal projections, this paper 
presents numerical estimates from a model of the Crown’s exposure to risk under current 
policy. The model enables the estimation of the Crown’s portfolio’s expected return and 
volatility, value-at-risk, and projections over time of the Crown’s exposure to risk, defined 
as the frequency distribution of the Crown’s net worth under planned policy. The model 
integrates analysis of the Crown’s ordinary assets and liabilities with projections of 
spending and taxes under planned policy. It can be used therefore to analyse the Crown’s 
comprehensive  net worth, which includes the present value of projected taxes and 
spending as well as accounting net worth according to generally accepted accounting 
practice (GAAP). It can also be used to analyse recently developed measures that 
exclude from net worth the value of social assets, such as roads and schools. 
Our base case implies that the Crown’s exposure to risk is large. The Crown’s 
comprehensive portfolio has annual volatility (standard deviation) of around $30 billion: to 
offset a permanent loss of this size, taxes would have to be permanently increased by 3%. 
(Results for other measures of net worth are also reported.) The results, it should be 
emphasised, are only very approximate. They are sensitive to numerous modeling 
assumptions and estimates, including estimates of correlations and volatilities about 
which reliable data are scarce. 
The model can be used to estimate the effect of changes in the Crown’s balance sheet on 
the Crown’s exposure to risk. We illustrate with a hypothetical policy change, which we 
emphasise that we are not advocating: replacing half of the Debt Management Office’s 
New Zealand dollar–denominated debt with US dollar–denominated debt.  
We believe the model would be useful both in regular fiscal reporting, alongside the 
existing suite of fiscal measures, and in risk management (for example, by applying it to 
policy choices that have important effects on risk). But it is important to keep the 
limitations of the model in mind. Judgment is required in interpreting the results of the 
model, not least because of the uncertainties in parameter estimation. Moreover, the 
model is not the only approach to quantifying the Crown’s exposure to risk and other 
complementary approaches are worth exploring.  
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2  Need for central risk management 
The Crown’s exposure to financial risk matters. The cost to New Zealand of the Crown’s 
getting into financial distress would be very high; witness recent crises in Argentina, 
Iceland, and Ireland. So it is useful to assess the extent of that risk and to try to keep it 
very low. There is also a widely accepted case for reducing the variability of tax rates and 
government spending, which also requires monitoring and when necessary adjusting the 
Crown’s exposure to risk.
1
 
2.1  Crown’s exposure to risk can be managed only 
centrally 
If the government is to manage the Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk, it must do so 
centrally. We define risk management as the measurement and monitoring of risk, as well 
as the setting of policy to achieve an acceptable level of risk. The riskiness of the Crown’s 
portfolio depends on the riskiness (variance) of each part of the portfolio and on the 
correlations among the parts. The higher the correlations among assets and among 
liabilities, the greater the risk, and the higher the correlation between assets and liabilities, 
the lower the risk. Only by considering the correlations can the risk of the Crown’s portfolio 
be understood. The managers of one part of the Crown’s portfolio (for example, debt or a 
set of financial assets) may know how risky their assets or liabilities are considered by 
themselves, but they cannot be expected to know the correlations between the value of 
their assets and liabilities and the value of the rest of the Crown’s portfolio. So the 
managers cannot be expected to know how their choices affect the Crown’s exposure to 
risk. The management of the Crown’s assets and liabilities can be decentralised, and 
individual managers can manage the risks to which their portfolios are exposed. But the 




The nature of risk also means that the management of the Crown’s exposure to risk needs 
to take account of all the Crown’s main assets and liabilities (all its main sources of future 
cash inflows and outflows). This requires the analysis of a ‘comprehensive’ balance sheet, 
which includes a notional ‘tax asset’ and ‘spending liability’ as well as those assets and 
liabilities reported in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). For 
some purposes, it is of course useful to look at the GAAP balance sheet because it 
excludes policy commitments whose costs the government can influence, and focuses on 
debt and other liabilities that represent binding obligations. But even assessing the risk to 
which the GAAP balance sheet is exposed over any time period requires consideration of 
the correlation between GAAP assets and liabilities and spending and tax receipts over 
that time period. 
                                                                  
1   Duffie and Singleton (2003, Ch. 2) contains a useful discussion of the economics of risk management that focuses on the costs of 
financial distress. Barro (1979) argues for smoothing taxes over time and Bohn (1990) argues for smoothing tax over states of 
nature. Skilling (1997), McCulloch (1998), and Huther (1999) are examples of early discussions of the goals of risk management 
for the Crown. 
2    This is consistent with the conclusions of Grimes (2001): ‘…individual Crown financial entities should each continue to be 
responsible for setting their own strategic asset allocation, after taking into account the nature of their liabilities. A central Crown 
body should, however, monitor and aggregate information from each of these entities and be delegated the responsibility and 
power to manage risks to the overall Crown balance sheet.’  
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2.2  Management does not imply micromanagement 
Central management of risk does not, however, imply micromanagement of the 
comprehensive balance sheet. No central risk manager should try to measure the Crown’s 
exposure to every kind of risk or to fine-tune all those exposures. Risks should be 
managed by the people with the information, incentives, and capability to manage them. 
For most of the risks to which the Crown is exposed, those people are the managers of 
particular business units. The risk associated with the value of the Crown’s electricity 
assets, for example, depends on the quality of decisions to invest in and operate power 
stations and transmission networks. Those risks need to be managed by the people who 
understand the demand for electricity and the costs of supply and who (because of 
competition, regulation, or governance) have incentives to make good decisions. Any 
realistic central management of risk involves much delegation. The particular risks that are 
candidates for being managed centrally are those that affect many different parts of the 
Crown’s portfolio, such as risks associated with interest and exchange rates, the price of 
oil, the strength of the economy, and the creditworthiness of the Crown’s major 
counterparties. 
Central management of a risk need not involve more than central measurement and 
monitoring of risk and certain high-level instructions to the managers of parts of the 
Crown’s portfolio. It might, for example, involve instructions to some agencies to limit 
certain kinds of risks (for example, preventing certain agencies from borrowing) or 
instructions to other agencies to match their financial assets with certain liabilities—as, for 
example, the Debt Management Office matches financial assets to some of the debt the 
Crown has issued. If the matching is perfect—if the values of the matched assets and 
liabilities are perfectly correlated—the combination of the assets and liabilities is 
essentially risk-free. 
Lastly, although the management of the Crown’s exposure to risk must take account of 
the Crown’s comprehensive balance sheet, not all risk-management decisions must refer 
to an analysis of the comprehensive balance sheet. An analysis of the comprehensive 
balance sheet might suggest that a certain category of risk was concentrated in a certain 
part of the GAAP balance sheet. If so, day-to-day management of the risk could be made 
by reference only to that part of the GAAP balance sheet. 
2.3  Some central risk management already occurs  
At present, the government does several things centrally to manage the Crown’s exposure 
to risk. Some of them relate to the measurement of risk. For example, Economic and 
Fiscal Updates report ‘fiscal risks’ (choices that could cause spending to rise or revenue 
to fall) and the sensitivity of certain fiscal outcomes to economic variables such as GDP. 
They also show fiscal scenarios other than the central forecast and projection. Similarly, 
the government’s financial statements report how Crown net worth would change in 
response to changes in share prices, exchange rates, and interest rates (Table 1). These 
estimates do not purport to be comprehensive: they exclude all indirect effects and even 
the direct effect of interest rates on the estimated present value of the Crown’s non-
financial liabilities, such as claims on the Accident Compensation Corporation. But they 
are a useful start.  
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Table 1 – Government’s reporting of sensitivity to risk factors, 30 June 2009 
Change  Direct reduction in  
GAAP net worth  
($ billion) 
Increase of 1 percentage point in New Zealand–dollar interest rates  0.4 
Increase of 10% in the exchange value of the New Zealand dollar  0.3 
Decrease of 10% in share prices  1.1 
Source: Financial statements of the Government of New Zealand for the year ended 30 June 2009, note 33.  
The Crown also directs its agencies in a way that amounts to central risk management. 
For example, the Public Finance Act states that the Minister of Finance must authorise all 
borrowing on behalf of the Crown, and there is only one debt-management office. 
Treasury guidelines require government departments to hedge all but small exposures to 
foreign-exchange risk created by imports and other transactions (New Zealand Treasury, 
2003). 
Most important, fiscal strategy is risk management. Among other things, that strategy has 
involved limiting gross debt and avoiding net foreign-currency sovereign borrowing.
3
 Until 
recently, the strategy involved building up equities and other financial assets instead of 
further reducing gross debt, in part because the expected returns from holding those 
assets were considered attractive enough to outweigh the risks (Huther, 1998). By 
contrast, the recent temporary suspension of contributions to the NZSF reflected the 
Government’s view that the value of the expected returns from further contributions, which 
would be funded by borrowing, were outweighed by the risks. 
2.4  But central risk management is limited 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Treasury intensively investigated Crown financial 
policy. Huther (1998) and Fabling (2002) constructed comprehensive balance sheets and 
estimated the expected return and the variance of the Crown’s portfolio. Davis (2002) 
estimated uncertainty in the Crown’s long-term fiscal projections. But, at least until very 
recently, this work had slowed nearly to a standstill. And the measurement that the 
government does do—including the sensitivity and scenario analysis—falls short of an 
analysis of risk: it provides no estimate, even approximate, of the likelihood of various 
outcomes. Thus the government currently has no estimate of the Crown’s exposure to risk 
and no way of estimating how that exposure varies with policy. 
In the absence of quantitative estimates of the Crown’s exposure to risk, ministers must 
make (and officials must recommend) decisions about risk management on the basis of 
intuition or partial models. Intuitions about risk are, however, known to be systematically 
flawed. Uncertainty, for example, is frequently underestimated (see, for example, 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). And models that examine only parts of the Crown’s 
portfolio cannot incorporate all the relevant correlations and therefore cannot adequately 
address questions about the Crown’s exposure to risk. Although intuition and partial 
models can be helpful—and no comprehensive model of risk will be good enough to 
supplant them—exclusive reliance on them is problematic. 
                                                                  
3   A preference for issuing long-term local-currency debt seems reasonable, is consistent with practice in many countries, and it is 
supported by the IMF and World Bank (2001). But there are contrary views, cited, for example, in Grimes (2001).  
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The range of relevant risk-management questions is wide. Do current policies expose the 
Crown to too much risk? Should the deficit be reduced more quickly? Or are the risks small 
enough that more attention should be paid to continuing fiscal stimulus? Should the Crown’s 
exposure to risk be considered when choosing whether to alter the composition of the tax 
base (for example increasing GST and reducing corporate tax) or the risk-related effects 
small enough to ignore? Do contributions to the NZSF have a sufficiently attractive profile of 
risk and expected return that they should be resumed as quickly as possible? Or, on the 
contrary, should the NZSF be liquidated and the proceeds used to repay debt? Does foreign-
currency debt really offer an unattractive combination of cost and risk? Or would some net 
foreign-currency debt be better than none? 
Consistent with the lack of measurement, the Crown holds assets and liabilities in several 
portfolios that are managed more or less independently by various different agencies (the 
Debt Management Office, the NZSF, the Earthquake Commission, and so on). Although 
these agencies manage assets and liabilities for a common owner, each agency manages 
its own portfolios without much consideration of the interrelationships between portfolios, 
and thus the effects of their choices on the Crown’s exposure to risk. Nor can the 
agencies be sure what the Crown’s risk-related objectives are. True, the agencies are 
governed by rules that encourage them to act in the interests of the Crown, but the rules 
are too general to ensure appropriate actions in relation to risk. 
One of the goals of the NZSF, to take just one example, is ‘maximising return without undue 
risk to the Fund as a whole’. The risk to the Fund, however, may differ substantially from the 
effect of the Fund’s choices on the risk to the Crown. To the extent that the NZSF’s managers 
consider assets and liabilities that are not part of the Fund, they limit their attention to the 
liability (comprehensively defined) for which the Fund is named; ‘we plan’, they say, ‘to 
ensure we maximise our contribution to future superannuation payments by closely aligning 
our assets with the characteristics that drive future superannuation payments’ (Guardians of 
New Zealand Superannuation, 2008). 
In the absence of central direction, the managers of components of the Crown’s 
comprehensive portfolio may inadvertently take actions that are not in the Crown’s 
interest. They might expose the Crown to too much risk or pay too much to reduce risks 
that, from the Crown’s perspective, are very small: risks that appear large to managers of 
the components of the Crown’s portfolios may be insignificant for the Crown.
4
 Public-
sector managers may be especially inclined to excessive risk aversion, given the publicity 
that attends bad outcomes. Worse, if the value of a particular portfolio is naturally 
negatively correlated with the Crown’s comprehensive net worth, the manager of that 
portfolio may spend money to reduce the risk of the portfolio in a way that increases the 
Crown’s exposure to risk. 
Well-intentioned attempts to reduce the Crown’s exposure may also fail for lack of 
coordination. As noted above, the NZSF has contemplated choosing its assets with a view 
to reducing the risk of a larger portfolio containing its assets and the government’s 
(comprehensive) superannuation liabilities. The Debt Management Office has also 
contemplated matching the debt it issues against some of the NZSF’s assets. If both 
                                                                  
4   There is, for example, evidence that managers generally make decisions that are too risk averse given the preferences of the more 
senior managers to whom they report (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). See also Rabin (2000). Note, however, that some risk 
management by individual agencies may be helpful even if it is costly and does not improve the Crown’s exposure to risk. 
Consider a small government agency that chooses to hedge a foreign-exchange transaction or to insure its vehicles. An 
assessment of the Crown’s aggregate exposure to risk might suggest that not insuring or hedging was optimal. But this kind of risk 
management can help the agency manage its budget and aid assessment of its performance because it makes the agency’s 
performance depend less on things it cannot control.  
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agencies were to match their assets against the same set of liabilities, the result would be 
one unintended by either, and there would no reason to think that the Crown’s exposure to 
risk had been reduced. 
Lastly, the Crown may fail to take simple actions to reduce its exposure to risk at low cost. 
For example, the Crown may be exposed to more counterparty credit risk than is 
necessary. As part of their operations, several Crown agencies enter into derivative 
contracts with various banks. At any one time, some agencies may owe a given bank 
money, while others may be owed money by the bank. Unless the Crown enters into a 
master agreement, however, the Crown cannot net off contracts that are assets for the 
Crown against those that are liabilities for the Crown. If the bank fails, the agencies that 
owe money must pay, while the others must join the creditors’ queue.
5
 
2.5  Central risk management is difficult 
Several practical problems make central risk management especially difficult for the 
Crown. 
First, concerns are sometimes expressed that opening the door to central direction of risk 
taking could encourage political involvement in decisions that the government had 
previously decided were best delegated. For example, if ministers are encouraged to 
direct the NZSF to take a particular approach to foreign-exchange risk, they may be less 
inhibited about directing it to invest in particular businesses, for reasons unrelated to risk 
management. 
A second problem is the inevitable approximation in any measure of the Crown’s 
exposure to risk. Risk measurement is difficult even for organisations much smaller and 
simpler than the Crown. Future variances and correlations are unknown. They may be 
estimated from samples of historical data, but the samples may not be representative. 
And variances and correlations change over time. During a crisis, they may suddenly 
increase, aggravating an organisation’s exposure to risk. Other assumptions introduce 
further approximations. We assume that the annual changes in the values of assets and 
liabilities are normally distributed. This simplifies the analysis, but the distributions of 
actual changes in values of financial assets are often found to have fatter tails than those 
of a normal distribution. That means that extreme events are more likely. Our modeling 
may therefore underestimate the risk to which the Crown is exposed.
6
 
These problems apply to any organisation. Further problems arise for organisations such 
as the Crown that hold many untraded assets and liabilities. To estimate the risk in the 
Crown’s portfolio, the government needs to estimate the value of assets such as schools, 
roads, and the present value of future tax revenue. It also needs to estimate variances 
and correlations for these assets. Estimates can be made, but in some cases they may be 
no more than partially educated guesses. 
                                                                  
5   We owe this point to Pat Duignan. 
6   The use of a normal distribution may be less inaccurate in our modeling than in some other contexts because we model returns on 
an annual basis, and the evidence is that annual returns are much closer to normal than are daily or weekly returns (Akiray and 
Booth, 1998; Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay, 1997, Ch. 1; Timmerman, 1995). In addition, the biggest assets in the model are 
untraded GAAP assets and the tax asset, and we are not aware of any direct evidence about the nature of the distributions of 
returns on these assets.  
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And even accurate risk measurement reveals only probabilities, not a prediction of the 
future. Analysis might conclude, for example, that the probability of the Crown’s 
comprehensive net worth declining by more than, say, $50 billion next year under current 
policies was only 1 in 20 (see below for our estimates). Even if the measurement is 
correct, it does not imply that the Crown could lose no more than $50 billion next year. 
For these reasons, it is sometimes argued that traditional risk measurement is worse than 
nothing: not only are the results false, they create a false sense of security (Mandelbrot 
and Hudson, 2005). A more conventional view is that rough estimates of exposure to risk 
are better than no estimates. Decisions have to be made, and in the absence of estimates 
from a model they will be made on the basis of intuition alone, which may be very poor. 
Yet it is clear that results of risk measurement should be treated with great caution. 
A third limitation on the extent of feasible risk management is the difficulty of precisely 
specifying the Crown’s risk-measurement objective. If the objective is vague—keeping the 
chance of financial distress low and maintaining fairly stable tax rates and spending 
plans—a broad range of exposures to risk may be more or less equally acceptable: 
measurement may not identify any policy changes that clearly improve the Crown’s 
position. Being precise about the Crown’s appropriate objective is, however, difficult. 
It is common to frame choices about risk in terms of the expected return and the risk of a 
portfolio.
7
 Increasing the expected return of a portfolio generally implies accepting more 
risk, so the owner of a portfolio must generally trade off risk and expected return. In a 
simple world, the owner can say which of the feasible combinations of risk and expected 
return is best, and a risk manager can then adjust the portfolio to achieve the desired 
combination. This would be hard to do for the Crown. Typical Cabinet ministers are 
unlikely to have a numerical view about the risk to which they are prepared to expose the 
Crown. They are unlikely to want to answer questions such as, ‘Is it better for the Crown’s 
portfolio to have an expected return of 8% and volatility of 15% or an expected return of 
10% and a volatility of 20%?’ 
There is also a more fundamental problem. The Crown’s exposure to risk should not be 
chosen in isolation from New Zealanders’. Indeed, if the Crown’s goal was simply to 
reduce its exposure to risk, it could adopt a tax system that calculated tax due not as a 
proportion of income but as a proportion of the Crown’s spending. Because this just 
transfers risk from the Crown to New Zealanders, it is unattractive as risk management. 
Some insight into the formulation of the Crown’s risk-related objectives can be found in 
the practice of asset management by pension funds and insurance companies.
8
 These 
organisations have liabilities to their customers in the form of insurance contracts and 
pension obligations, and they have assets that help them meet their customer liabilities. 
The difference between their assets and liabilities is their net worth. Their objective can be 
expressed in terms of the risk and expected return of their net worth. Moreover, risk 
management can sometimes be framed as choosing the assets to achieve satisfactory 
levels of risk and expected return, taking the customer liabilities as given. 
The government’s choice might be conceived similarly. That is, risk management for the 
Crown might be viewed as selecting certain assets and liabilities to achieve desired risk 
and expected-return objectives, taking other assets and liabilities as given. For example, 
the composition of debt and financial assets could be varied, while other assets and 
                                                                  
7   Other aspects of the distribution such as skew or kurtosis could also matter. 
8   On these issues, see, for example, Sharpe (2003) and Merton and Bodie (1993).  
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liabilities, including the present values of future tax and spending was taken as given. 
Doing so would help distinguish between risk-reduction policies that involuntarily expose 
New Zealanders to greater risk and those that do not. 
But taking other assets and liabilities as given is not always desirable. For example, the 
Crown may be exposed to too much risk, even after the composition of debt and financial 
assets have been optimally chosen. If so, the government must think about changing 
taxes and spending plans. Taxes might be shifted to less volatile bases; eligibility criteria 
for spending might be changed to make spending more predictable. 
These problems do not, however, mean that risk management is impossible or that risk 
measurement is futile. Even in the absence of consensus about a precise goal, it may still 
be clear that the Crown’s exposure to risk is too great—or, alternatively, that it can safely 
be increased. Rough estimates of the Crown’s exposure to risk, and of how the exposure 
varies with policy changes, can help inform those judgements. 
2.6  But improvement is possible  
Given these problems, radical departure from the government’s current approach to risk 
management should not necessarily be expected. But there appears to be room for 
improvement.  
First, the government should routinely measure the Crown’s exposure to risk and estimate 
the effect of major risk-related policy changes on the exposure. Second, the government 
should seek to clarify the Crown’s risk-related objectives. It should not necessarily aim for 
numerical precision. But refinement and clear expression of those goals would be 
desirable. Together, better measurement and a clearer view of the goal of risk 
management should allow the Crown to decide whether to change the Crown’s exposure 
to risk. 
Changes could be made in several ways. One option would be for the government to 
direct the managers of the Crown’s main financial assets and liabilities to change their 
portfolios in certain ways—for example, to hedge or not hedge foreign exchange-rate 
risks; to hold or not hold domestic shares or foreign shares; to try to match their assets or 
liabilities with other of the Crown’s liabilities or assets. A second would be to centralise 
management of those portfolios, either by a direct transfer of the assets in the portfolios or 
by requiring the managers of the portfolios to invest only in specific assets. A third—
perhaps less likely option—would be to continue to allow those managers to choose their 
own approaches to risk management, but for a central risk manager to use derivative 
contracts to change the Crown’s exposure when that was deemed desirable. Such an 
approach could involve ‘undoing’ certain risk-management actions of the managers of 
portfolios, if the interests of the portfolio diverged from the interest of the Crown. Lastly, 
spending plans, tax rates, and tax bases could be changed with a view to changing the 
Crown’s exposure to risk.  
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3  Measuring the Crown’s exposure to risk 
In this section, we take up the challenge of measuring the Crown’s exposure to risk. 
3.1  The Crown’s comprehensive balance sheet 
The government publishes financial statements according to GAAP that include a balance 
sheet made up of the Crown’s financial and physical assets and its debts and other 
binding liabilities. Other resources and obligations that do not meet accounting recognition 
criteria are nonetheless important for risk analysis—in particular, the power to tax and the 
implicit obligation to provide social services. Incorporating the values of these rights and 
obligations is the essence of an approach to fiscal analysis known as comprehensive 
accounting (Buiter, 1984; Bradbury, Brumby and Skilling, 1999; Irwin, 2009). The 
approach has received recent attention from the rating agency Moody’s as a way to think 
about the riskiness of sovereign balance sheets (Moody’s, 2009). 
The ideal measure of fiscal sustainability is comprehensive net worth, defined as the 
present value of the government’s future net cash flows. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
measure with any precision. Among other things, any measurement relies on assumptions 
about the policy choices of future governments. The measurements underlying GAAP net 
worth are more reliable, and useful for many purposes, but GAAP net worth does not 
provide a good indication of fiscal sustainability because it represents only a subset of the 
cash flows that the Crown will pay or receive. And GAAP net worth is not without its 
measurement issues. For example, the book values of many assets do not reflect their 
market value. Many SOEs in particular would probably sell for more than their book value. 
A further measurement issue is that some of the Crown’s GAAP assets are unlikely to 
generate future cash flows. For example, national parks and social infrastructure such as 
schools are unlikely either to be sold or to be used to generate revenues and therefore 
cannot be used to repay debt. The relevance of the volatility of these assets to fiscal 
analysis is therefore questionable. Yet these assets still deliver a stream of benefits to the 
Crown, and if the Crown did not own them, it would presumably have to lease them to 
meet its implicit obligations. If so, holding the assets reduces future cash outflows. 
Because each measure of net worth has advantages and disadvantages, we look at four 
measures of the Crown’s net worth: GAAP net worth; net worth excluding social assets; 
and two measures of comprehensive net worth. One starts with GAAP net worth and adds 
the present value of future primary revenue and subtracts the present value of future 
primary spending flows.
9
 The other excludes social assets. These measures are defined 
more precisely in Table 2.  
                                                                  
9   Primary revenue is defined as core Crown tax revenue and other non-investment income. Primary spending is core Crown 
operating expenses excluding finance costs and without losses. These accrual-based aggregates are used to proxy cash flows.  
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Table 2 – Measures of net worth 
Net worth measure  Definition 
GAAP net worth  Total Crown assets minus liabilities, reported in accordance with GAAP 
Net worth excluding social assets  GAAP net worth minus social assets. Social assets are defined as the 
non-financial assets of the core Crown, Crown Entities and the 
New Zealand Railways Corporation 
Comprehensive net worth excluding 
social assets 
Net worth excluding social assets plus the present value of future primary 
revenue minus the present value of future primary spending 
Comprehensive net worth  GAAP net worth plus the present value of future primary revenue minus 
the present value of future primary spending 
 
To quantify future primary revenue and spending we use the projections contained in 
Treasury’s  Long-term Fiscal Statement published in October 2009. The Statement 
contains two scenarios of future spending—one based on historic trends and the other on 
the Government’s stated fiscal strategy. Both are relevant as interpretations of the 
Government’s spending commitments. Table 3 reports estimates of the comprehensive 
balance sheets constructed from each of these scenarios. The projection of historic trends 
leads to an unsustainable increase in debt, whereas the government’s stated fiscal 
strategy is sustainable. The projection of historic trends helps understand the implicit 
liabilities the government faces under current policy from population ageing and the 
growth in the cost of government services such as healthcare. But it is inconsistent with 
the Government’s risk-management objectives. So we base our analysis on the 
projections contained in the sustainable debt scenario. 
Table 3 – The Crown’s comprehensive balance sheet, 30 June 2009 






GAAP net worth  99  99 
Present value of primary revenue  960  960 
Present value of primary expenditure   1104  962 
Comprehensive net worth  (45)  96 
Note: A nominal discount rate of 10% has been used to calculate the present values of primary revenue and expenditure. The long-
term fiscal projections extend to 2050. An infinite discount horizon is used by assuming primary revenue and expenditure in 
subsequent years each grow at a constant rate, determined by the final-year rate of growth.  
Sources: New Zealand Government, the Treasury, authors’ calculations.  
In Table 4 we report our calculation of net worth excluding social assets. At −$3 billion, it 
is about $100 billion lower than GAAP net worth. The difference is the estimated value of 
social assets.   
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Table 4 – Net worth excluding social assets, 30 June 2009 
 $  billion 
State-owned enterprises (excluding New Zealand Rail)   32 
Air New Zealand (minus minority interest)  5 
Financial assets of core Crown and Crown entities  91 
Intersegmental eliminations  (13) 
GAAP assets excluding social assets  115 
GAAP liabilities  118 
Net worth excluding social assets  (3) 
Sources: New Zealand Government, authors’ calculations 
3.2  Modeling the Crown’s exposure to risk 
To model the components that contribute to the Crown’s aggregate risk, we decompose 
the comprehensive balance sheet into entity-based classes. The most significant GAAP 
assets are those of state-owned enterprises, Crown financial institutions
10
 and physical 
assets such as roads, schools, hospitals, and state houses. Among the most significant 
GAAP liabilities are the unhedged debt managed by the Debt Management Office, the 
insurance liabilities of the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), and pension 
liabilities of the Government Superannuation Fund (GSF). The net assets of smaller 
entities are aggregated into an ‘other’ category. Along with these reported assets and 
liabilities are the present values of primary revenue and spending, which are derived from 
the long-term fiscal projections using a nominal discount rate of 10%. Assets and liabilities 
could be broken down into smaller constituent parts if desired. We have not done this, in 
part to limit the number of parameters that we have to estimate. 
To model the Crown’s exposure to risk, we essentially integrate a standard analysis of the 
risk of a portfolio of assets and liabilities with an analysis of the risks created by uncertain 
future spending and tax revenue.
11
 We estimate some results analytically (that is, with the 
use of closed-form formulas) and others with Monte Carlo simulation.
12
 Appendix 1 
describes the mathematical structure of the model. 
To derive the results we need an estimate, for each class of asset and liability, of the 
expected return, the variance of the return, and the correlation of the return with the 
returns of other assets and liabilities. The most difficult parameters to estimate are the 
correlations. We look at historical data, typically using historical time series of indices that 
we believe are reasonable proxies for the assets and liabilities in the model. For some 
parameters we have had to use our judgement. Appendix 2 describes the estimation of 
the parameters in the model. 
                                                                  
10   The financial asset portfolios of the NZSF, Accident Compensation Corporation, the Earthquake Commission and the Government 
Superannuation Fund. 
11   The literature on empirical risk quantification of sovereign net worth is limited, but see Adrogué (2005), Barnhill and Kopits (2003), 
Barnhill (2006), and Burnside (2004). 
12   Monte Carlo simulation enables us to numerically construct projected frequency distributions. Deriving frequency distributions 
analytically would be infeasible owing to the complicated nature of the functional forms in the model. All the results presented in 
this paper that are derived using the Monte Carlo technique are the result of running the model with 10,000 simulations.  
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3.3  The Crown’s risk budget 
We begin by presenting a notional risk budget for the Crown. Risk budgeting is the 
practice of systematically allocating a level of risk exposure across asset classes or 
business units (Mina, 2005). It is used by financial firms to allocate capital to achieve risk-
management objectives. For example, an investment management firm may wish to 
allocate its market risk exposure equally among its investment managers. This is not the 
same as allocating an equal amount of investment capital to each manager because the 
risk exposure will depend on the riskiness of each manager’s market position. While the 
government does not use risk budgeting, we apply the technique to get a rough 
understanding of the importance of various sources of risk. 
To construct the notional risk budget, we measure the risk of each asset and liability class 
as its annual standard deviation.
13
 If returns are normally distributed, each asset and 
liability class will experience a loss at least as large as this with annual probability of 
around 16%, or about every six years. 
The model implies first that the Crown’s comprehensive net worth has annual volatility of 
$30 billion. Offsetting a loss of that amount would require a permanent increase in taxes 
of 3.2%.  
We can also present an approximate indication of where that risk comes from (Table 5 
and Figure 1). The measures are only indicative because the contribution of an asset to 
the Crown’s total exposure to risk depends on correlations: to the extent that the 
correlations are less than 1, each entity’s contribution to the Crown’s total risk will be less 
than the amount reported. The total effect of imperfect correlations is the benefit of 
diversification.
14
 With that proviso, we can note that about half of the total risk comes from 
the primary balance and about a quarter from social assets (Figure 1). If social assets are 
excluded from comprehensive net worth, annual volatility is reduced to $26  billion, 
equivalent to a 2.7% permanent change in taxes and the relative importance of the other 
items increases (Table 6 and Figure 2). 
It is not surprising that the primary balance dominates the risk budget. The present value 
of primary revenues, for example, is more than 20 times as great as the asset value of all 
state-owned enterprises. Nonetheless, other assets and liabilities also matter: the analysis 
shows that they may contribute up to a quarter or a third of the Crown’s financial risk 
depending on whether social assets are excluded from the analysis. 
                                                                  
13   For simplicity, this analysis does not take into account the expected returns of entities and therefore this analysis indicates the risk 
of deviating from the expected future level of net worth, rather than the risk of loss on the current level of net worth (which is 
affected by return assumptions). 
14   More technically, the diversification benefit reported in Tables 5 and 6 is the difference between a portfolio’s volatility and the sum 
of volatilities of the portfolio’s constituent parts.  
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needed to fund 
a one standard 
deviation loss 
(%) 
Primary revenue  959.5  3.0  28.8    
Primary spending  -962.4  1.5  14.4    
         
Diversification benefit        -18.3    
         
Primary balance  -2.9  852.8  24.9  2.6 
         
GAAP assets             
Reserve Bank of New Zealand  2.3  4  0.1    
New Zealand Super Fund  12.9  10  1.3    
ACC  12.2  15  1.8    
Earthquake Commission  1.8  15  0.3    
GSF  2.8  10  0.3    
New Zealand Railways   13.0  12  1.6    
Meridian Energy   4.4  20  0.9    
Mighty River Power  2.8  20  0.6    
Landcorp Farming   1.3  20  0.3    
Genesis Power   1.4  20  0.3    
Transpower New Zealand   1.4  20  0.3    
New Zealand Post   0.6  20  0.1    
Other SOEs  2.6  20  0.5    
Air New Zealand  2.6  20  0.5    
Transport   23.2  12  2.8    
Housing New Zealand   13.7  12  1.6    
Ministry of Education/Schools  12.9  12  1.5    
District Health Boards  3.6  12  0.4    
Student loans  6.6  4  0.3    
Other  38.6  12  4.6    
              
GAAP liabilities             
DMO (unhedged debt)  -23.2  4  0.9    
ACC  -26.7  6  1.6    
GSF  -11.8  5  0.6    
              
Diversification benefit        -6.6    
              
GAAP net worth  99.1  16.8  16.7  1.7 
              
Diversification benefit        -10.9    
              
Comprehensive net worth  96.1  31.9  30.6  3.2  
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needed to fund 
a one standard 
deviation loss 
(%) 
              
Primary revenue  959.5  3.0  28.8    
Primary spending  -962.4  1.5  14.4    
         
Diversification benefit        -18.3    
              
Primary balance  -2.9  852.8  24.9  2.6 
              
GAAP assets excluding social assets             
Reserve Bank of New Zealand  2.2  4  0.1    
New Zealand Super Fund  11.7  10  1.2    
ACC  12.0  15  1.8    
Earthquake Commission  1.7  15  0.3    
GSF  2.8  10  0.3    
New Zealand Railways   -0.2  4  0.0    
Meridian Energy   4.4  20  0.9    
Mighty River Power  2.8  20  0.6    
Landcorp Farming   1.3  20  0.3    
Genesis Power   1.4  20  0.3    
Transpower New Zealand   1.4  20  0.3    
New Zealand Post   0.6  20  0.1    
Other SOEs  2.6  20  0.5    
Air New Zealand  2.6  20  0.5    
Transport   -0.3  4  0.0    
Housing New Zealand   -0.9  4  0.0    
Ministry of Education/Schools  -0.3  4  0.0    
District Health Boards  -1.0  4  0.0    
Student loans  6.6  4  0.3    
Other  7.6  4  0.3    
              
GAAP liabilities             
DMO (unhedged debt)  -23.2  4  0.9    
ACC  -26.7  6  1.6    
GSF  -11.8  5  0.6    
              
Diversification benefit        -4.0    
              
Net worth excluding social assets  -2.6  260.8  6.9  0.7 
              
Diversification benefit        -5.7    
              
Comprehensive net worth 
excluding social assets  -5.5  468.9  26.0  2.7 
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Figure 1 – Sources of risk on comprehensive balance sheet 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Figure 2 – Sources of risk on the comprehensive balance sheet excluding social 
assets 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
3.4  Stochastic projections of net worth 
The risk-budget results are useful indicators of the Crown’s exposure to risk. But their 
value is limited because they do not take into account expected returns or give an 
indication of the future path of net worth. 
We measure the Crown’s projected exposure to risk as the frequency distribution of the 
value of these assets and liabilities and hence of the Crown’s comprehensive (or GAAP) 
net worth. Our measures are based on projections of taxes and spending, so they are 
estimates of projected risk, not actual risk.
15
 From the estimated frequency distributions, 
we derive estimates of the probability distribution of the Crown’s future net worth and thus 
of the probability that the Crown’s net worth will fall below a given value for various time 
                                                                  
15   That is, we estimate the frequency distributions of future net worth conditional on planned policy, not the unconditional frequency 
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horizons (all assuming planned policy).
16
 We present results for the estimated frequency 
distributions over the next ten years, though the nearer-term estimates (say one to five 
years ahead) are the most relevant: the greater the elapse of the time, the greater the 
chance that the government will respond to unexpected outcomes by changing its 
policies.  
Projections are plotted in Figures 3 to 6 below. Estimates of value-at-risk at the 95% 
probability level for one-, three-, and five-year horizons are shown in Table 7. These 
estimates indicate the maximum loss in net worth that could be expected to occur with 
95% probability over the given time horizon. Or put another way, an event as bad as this 
or worse could be expected to occur once every 20 years.  
These results indicate, as would be expected, that the range of probable outcomes 
widens with time (holding policy constant). The comprehensive portfolio has the largest 
variance. There is significant volatility associated with social assets and hence the 
portfolio excluding social assets is much less risky than other portfolios. 
The results suggest that the Crown’s value-at-risk at the 95% probability level over a 5-
year horizon is very large. With an estimated probability of 5%, for example, net worth 
excluding social assets could fall by more than $70 billion and comprehensive net worth 
by more than $120 billion. Such a reduction in comprehensive net worth is equivalent to a 
required increase in tax revenue of 12%. 
Figure 3 – GAAP net worth ($ billion) 









                                                                  
16   Comprehensive net worth is defined here as the expected value of future cash flows, and so is represented as a point estimate in 
the current time period, rather than a probability distribution. The distributions of future values for comprehensive net worth can be 
interpreted as the distribution of possible expected values of cash flows (valued at the future time period), conditional on different 
states of the world.  
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Figure 4 – Net worth excluding social assets ($ billion) 









Figure 5 – Comprehensive net worth excluding social assets ($ billion)  
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Figure 6 – Comprehensive net worth ($ billion) 









Table 7 – Value-at-risk at 95% probability level 




(%) $  billion 
Tax change 
(%) $  billion 
Tax change 
(%) 
GAAP net worth  27  2.8  54  5.7  77  8.0 
Net worth excluding 
social assets  18 1.9  48.5 5.1  76 7.9 
Comprehensive net worth 
excluding social assets  52 5.4  101  10.5  138  14.4 
Comprehensive net worth  52  5.4  90  9.4  122  12.7 
3.5  Comparison with the 2008–09 recession 
At first sight, losses of this size might seem implausibly large. Certainly, the changes in 
comprehensive net worth are large relative to historical changes in GAAP net worth. Are 
they plausible? 
One way to get a sense of the realism of the estimates is to consider what happened to 
comprehensive net worth during the recession of 2008–09. Table 8 provides a very rough 
estimate. The effect on the GAAP balance sheet is estimated using the reported net 
losses for the fiscal year to 30 June 2009. For the change in the primary balance, we use 
the change in projected tax revenue between the 2008 and 2009 Budget Economic and 
Fiscal Updates (but assuming tax policy is held constant).  
The table shows that the Crown’s comprehensive loss from the recession was about $64 
billion. This loss is larger than the model’s estimate of value-at-risk at the 95% probability 
level over a one-year horizon ($52 billion). According to the model, the estimated loss 
experienced in 2008–09 has an annual probability of only 2.5%. Thus, a shock this bad or 
worse could be expected about once every 40 years.   
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Table 8 – Approximate impact of the 2008–09 recession on the Crown’s 
comprehensive balance sheet 
  $ billions 
GAAP total gains/(losses) for year ended 30 June 2009  (7) 
Change in the present value of projected tax revenue 
between 30 June 2008 and 30 June 2009  (57) 
Total (64) 
Sources: New Zealand Government, the Treasury, authors’ calculations 
3.6 Sensitivity  analysis 
To investigate the sensitivity of risk to changes in key parameters in the model, we report 
results using more extreme choices for volatility, correlation, and discount-rate 
parameters. We find that the results are materially sensitive to changes in these 
parameters. 
Changing the volatilities of all the individual asset and liability classes in the model linearly 
changes aggregate volatility. Thus, a 10% increase in volatility of all entities would 
increase aggregate risk by 10%. An extreme scenario would be to assume a doubling of 
all volatilities, which would double the measured volatility of aggregate net worth.  
Correlations are a focus of risk analysis because they are critical and yet difficult to 
estimate accurately and can change over time. We report the sensitivity of results to more 
extreme correlations in Table 9. The more extreme assumptions lead to a doubling of the 
estimate of the Crown’s exposure to risk. The single most important correlation coefficient 
in the model is that between primary revenue and primary spending. In the base case, this 
parameter is set to 0.5. It is less than 1 because we have an assumption of unchanged 
policy commitments (unexpected revenue increases are not assumed to be perfectly 
correlated with increased spending or decreased taxes). The economic intuition for the 
positive value is that even with current policy commitments, much spending is positively 
correlated to revenue because both are influenced by economic growth (for example, New 
Zealand Superannuation payments are indexed to the average wage and public-sector 
wages tend to increase with average wages). Sensitivity to this parameter is tested using 
correlation values of between 0 and 1. We also look at changing all other correlation 
coefficients in the model. The base case correlation coefficients are reported in Appendix 
2 and average 0.4 in magnitude. To test sensitivity, we set all asset–asset and liability–
liability correlations to 0.8 and correlations between assets and liabilities to –0.8.   
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Table 9 – Sensitivity to more extreme correlations  
Permanent increase in taxes 
required to fund an annual one 
standard deviation loss in 
comprehensive net worth (%) 
All correlations except the correlation between primary 
revenue and spending 
Base case  Asset–asset/liability–liability 
correlations set to 0.8 and asset-
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1.0  2.8 5.6 
The discount rate used to calculate the present value of the primary balance is set to 10% 
(nominal) in the base case. The choice of discount rate is largely arbitrary, but is 
approximately consistent with the Treasury’s estimate of the social opportunity cost of 
capital as being 8% real (New Zealand Treasury, 2008). An increase in the discount rate 
decreases the size of the tax asset and the spending liability and therefore decreases the 
dollar value of the risk. However, this risk as a percentage of tax revenue is higher 
because the risk exposure of GAAP net worth is unchanged, while the tax asset is 
smaller. A 6% discount rate would mean that annual volatility in comprehensive net worth 
would be $71 billion (2.6% tax change) and applying a 14% discount rate would mean an 
exposure of $23 billion (4.0% tax change). This compares with the base case value of $30 
billion (3.2% tax change). 
3.7  Application to policy 
Results such as those just presented could be included in the suite of fiscal indicators that 
informs the government’s fiscal strategy. In addition, the model could be used to analyse 
the effect on risk of changes in the composition of the Crown’s balance sheet. We 
illustrate this with a hypothetical policy change, in which half the Debt Management 
Office’s unmatched debt portfolio (about $23 billion as at 30 June 2009) is replaced with 
US dollar–denominated debt. Our purpose is to model and analyse sensitivity of risk to 
policy, not to propose or even seriously discuss possible policy changes. We recognise 
that policy decisions will be based on a much wider set of considerations than those 
discussed here. We emphasise that further refinement of parameter estimation would be 
necessary to produce robust results. 
We estimate that the volatility of US-dollar debt is significantly higher than the volatility 
NZ-dollar debt, because of the exposure to exchange-rate fluctuations.
17 Nevertheless, 
the change could reduce the Crown’s exposure to risk if US-dollar debt is less correlated 
with other Crown liabilities or more correlated with the Crown’s assets.  
                                                                  
17   For the purposes of the modeling, we have assumed that the cost of US dollar–denominated debt would be the same as NZ 
dollar–denominated debt. In practice, the relative costliness of debt under each approach should also be a factor in the analysis.  
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We find that issuing US-dollar debt would have ambiguous effects on the Crown’s risk 
exposure. The model indicates that GAAP net worth and comprehensive net worth would 
be exposed to more risk, but net worth excluding social assets would be exposed to less 
risk. In the latter case, the effect of the correlations outweighs the effect of the higher 
variance of the US-dollar debt. To the extent that weight is attached to the net worth 
excluding social assets, the result casts some doubt on the conventional view that 
domestic currency debt is lower risk. It is possible that the conventional view attaches too 
much weight to the volatility of the value of foreign-currency debt and too little weight to its 
correlations with other assets and liabilities on the Crown’s balance sheet. But it is also 
possible that our estimates of correlations are wrong. Or, even if they are accurate 
estimates of average correlations, it may be that foreign-currency debt is particularly risky 
during bad times. During the recent crisis, for example, the New Zealand dollar fell sharply 
against the US dollar, just when the present value of tax revenue also fell sharply.  
Previous empirical work has also raised questions about optimal currency composition of 
debt. Fowlie and Wright (1997) used a tax-smoothing approach that found that there were 
benefits from issuing foreign currency debt over 1985 to 1995. However, other work, such 
as Hawkesby and Wright (1997), arrived at the opposite conclusion, finding that the 
issuance of nominal domestic debt was preferable because it hedged supply-side 
economic shocks. 
Table 10 – US-dollar debt scenario (change in 95% value-at-risk relative to the base 
case) 




change (%)  $ billion 
Tax 
change (%)  $ billion 
Tax 
change (%) 
GAAP  net  worth  0.9 0.1  4.8 0.5  4.1 0.4 
Net worth excluding social 
assets  -0.9 -0.1  -4.2 -0.4  -8.5 -0.9 
Comprehensive net worth 
excluding social assets  -0.5 -0.1  -6.4 -0.7  -9.4 -1.0 
Comprehensive  net  worth  1.0 0.1  2.8 0.3  2.2 0.2 
Note: Figures shown represent the difference between the results for this scenario and the values reported in Table 7. 
Positive (negative) values denote an increase (decrease) in value-at-risk.  
3.8 Concluding  remarks 
The model we have developed enables quantification of the Crown’s exposure to risk. It 
could be used in regular reporting, for example, as part of the suite of other fiscal 
indicators and in risk management (for example, by applying it to real policy questions).  
To be incorporated in regular reporting, the model will require further refinement, 
particularly with respect to parameter estimation. In any case, it is important to keep the 
limitations of the model in mind. Judgement is required in interpreting the results of the 
model. And some policy issues with implications for balance-sheet risk will be too fine 
grained for this model to be able to shed useful light on the desirable course of action (for 
example, an SOE increasing its gearing). Value-at-risk models tend to be better at 
measuring risk under ‘normal’ conditions than under extreme conditions.    
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The modeling could be improved with more detailed analysis of some parts of the balance 
sheet. Moreover, off-balance sheet risks, such as contingent liabilities, could also be added to 
the model so long as a probability distribution of possible outcomes can be specified. 
This model is not the only approach to quantifying the Crown’s exposure to risk. It might 
also be worth exploring other complementary approaches. One is to develop a ‘factor’ 
model in which the central issue is the sensitivity of the Crown’s assets and liabilities to a 
small set of underlying factors, such as interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices, and 
the strength of the economy. Another is to make the long-term fiscal model stochastic; 
that is, to allow projected revenues and spending to evolve with random elements as well 
as the existing trends. A third is to integrate analysis of the Crown’s finances with those of 
other sectors of the economy (for example, Gray, Merton, and Bodie, 2008). This 
approach is attractive because the Crown’s financial position depends closely on the 
financial position of households and businesses and because the chance of a very bad 
fiscal outcome is closely linked in particular to the health of the banking sector.  
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Appendix 1: Structure of the model 
Model variables 
The balance sheet is decomposed into asset and liability classes (denoted by subscript 𝑖 
hereafter). The classes are based on the different entities that manage assets or liabilities 
on behalf of the Crown. 
In addition, we model the primary balance with a notional asset class for the present value 
of primary revenue and a notional liability class for the present value of future primary 
spending.  
The value of each asset or liability class 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is denoted as 𝑉  , with assets taking 
positive values and liabilities taking negative ones. Net worth at time 𝑡 is denoted 𝑁𝑊 . 
The particular measure of net worth (eg, GAAP or comprehensive) depends on the choice 
of asset and liability classes. 
𝑁𝑊  = 𝑉   
 
 
Table 11 – Description of variables and parameters 
Symbol Definition 
𝑉    Value of asset or liability class 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
𝑁𝑊   Crown net worth at time 𝑡. Note we can choose which measure of net worth (eg, GAAP or 
comprehensive) by the choice of asset and liability classes.  
𝑅   Crown primary revenue at time 𝑡. 
𝐸   Crown primary expenditure at time 𝑡.  
𝑁𝐶𝐼    Net capital injection into asset or liability class 𝑖 at time 𝑡. A negative value signifies a withdrawal 
of capital (ie, dividend for an asset class and borrowing for a liability class). 
𝗾   Net capital injection ratio. It is assumed that the net capital injection is a constant proportion of 
the value of an asset or liability class.  
𝗿  Discount rate used to compute present value of primary revenue and expenditure.  
𝜇   Mean return (compounded continuously) for asset or liability class 𝑖 on the reported balance 
sheet. 
𝜇   ,   Expected growth in 𝑅  at time 𝑡. 
𝜇     ,   Expected growth in 𝐸  at time 𝑡. 
𝜎   Standard deviation of return to asset or liability class. 
𝜌    Correlation coefficient of asset or liability classes 𝑖 and 𝑗.   
𝜀    Random number drawn from standard normal distribution with correlation structure 𝑬 𝜀  𝜀   =
𝜌  . 
𝑬[∙]  Expected value operator.  
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Modeling the dynamics 
For the reported balance sheet, we assume that the value of each asset and liability class 
will evolve over time with a stochastic rate of return and net of any capital injections or 
dividends. That is: ‘Change in value of asset or liability class = average return (drift) + 
stochastic element (volatility) + net capital injection’. 
For primary revenue and spending, we also assume that growth occurs in a stochastic 
fashion: ‘Change in revenue or expenses = expected growth rate + stochastic element 
(volatility)’. 
We can then compute the value of the primary revenue asset or spending liability by 
computing the present value of expected future cash flows. 
We can represent these dynamics as follows in the notation of stochastic differential 












𝑑𝑉    =𝜇  𝑉  𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎 𝑉  𝑑𝑊 + 𝑁𝐶𝐼     for  𝑖 ∉ {𝑡𝑎𝑥,𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑}
𝑑𝑅  =𝜇    , 𝑅 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎   𝑅 𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝐸  =𝜇      , 𝐸 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎     𝐸 𝑑𝑊
𝑉   ,  = 
𝑬[𝑅   ]
(1+𝗿) 
 
   
𝑉     ,  = 
𝑬[𝐸   ]
(1+𝗿) 
 
   
 
Assumptions and constraints 
Nature of the randomness  
For each individual asset and liability class on the reported balance sheet, and the annual 
revenue and expenditure flows, the continuously compounded single-period returns are 
modeled as independent and identically distributed (IID) variables.  
Thus, the model assumes that the variance of returns is constant over time with no serial 
correlation (ie, future returns are not correlated with past returns). The model assumes 
different means and variances of returns for different asset and liability classes and allows 
for cross-sectional correlation in the distribution of returns. We assume that the correlation 
coefficients remain constant over time. 
The continuously compounded returns are assumed to be drawn from the normal 
distribution. This means that single-period gross simple returns are distributed as IID 
lognormal (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997). Given that the actual distributions may 
have different properties to the normal distribution (eg, fatter tails), it may be worthwhile to 
consider modeling with alternative probability distributions in future work.  
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Expectations of future government tax and spending 
We define the tax asset (spending liability) as the discounted sum of expected revenue 
(expenditure) cash flows. We compute this by first computing annual government revenue 
and expenditure using the stochastic process described above. Then expected values for 
future revenue and expenditure are derived by assuming revenue and expenditure will 
grow at rates determined by separate long-term fiscal projections, assuming constant 
terminal growth rates. That is, once we have computed single-period revenue or 






𝑬[𝑅   ]=𝑅    (1 + 𝜇   ,   
 
   
) 
𝑬[𝐸   ]=𝐸    (1 + 𝜇     ,   
 
   
)
 
Capital budget identity 
There is an accounting identity whereby the sum of net capital injections to each asset 
and liability cannot exceed the government’s operating balance in any one time-period. 
That is:  
 𝑁 𝐶 𝐼    =𝑅   −𝐸  
 
 ∉{   ,     }
 
The Crown may borrow to increase the capital of one of its asset holdings or reduce a 
liability, but this is equivalent to a negative net capital injection into debt, so the identity 
holds. The identity can be rewritten:  
𝑁𝐶𝐼    ,  = (𝑅  −𝐸  )    −   𝑁𝐶𝐼  
  
 ∉{   ,     ,    }
 
In words, this says ‘debt repayment = operating balance – other net capital injections’. 
Debt is the residual 
For asset and liability classes on the reported balance sheet, excluding debt, we model 
net capital injections to be a constant proportion of their total values. We set a parameter 
𝗾  ∈ [−1,1] which defines a constant proportional capital injection where 𝗾  >0  or a 
constant proportional capital withdrawal (ie, dividend to the Crown) where 𝗾  <0 . The net 
capital injection into debt is the residual to maintain the capital budget identity.  
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Procedure for solving the model 
To generate the stochastic projections of net worth we follow these steps: 
1.  Set initial values:  
 














𝜇  for  𝑖 ∉ {𝑡𝑎𝑥,𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑}
𝜇   ,  
𝜇     ,  
𝜎  
𝜌    
 
3.  Generate a matrix of random numbers [𝜀  ] for 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1,2,…,𝑇 from the 
standard normal distribution and with the correlation structure 𝑬 𝜀  𝜀   =𝜌   . 
4.  Compute values of the asset and liability classes for each 𝑡 = 1,2,…,𝑇 by solving the 


























𝑉   = (1+𝗾  ) 𝑉 (   )𝑒
    
  
 
         
  for 𝑖 ∉ {𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡,𝑡𝑎𝑥,𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑}
𝑅  =𝑅    𝑒
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𝐸  =𝐸    𝑒
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𝑉   ,  = 
𝑅  ∏ (1 + 𝜇   ,   
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(1+𝗿) 
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𝐸  ∏ (1 + 𝜇     ,   
 
    )
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              , 
+ (𝑅  −𝐸  )    
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 ∉{   ,     ,    }
 
5.  Compute net worth for each  𝑡 = 1,2,…,𝑇 using the values derived in the fourth step: 
𝑁𝑊  = 𝑉   
 
 
6.  We use Monte Carlo simulation and thus repeatedly simulate steps 3 to 5 to construct 
a frequency distribution of net worth.   
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Appendix 2: Calibration of the model 
Asset and liability values 
The balance sheet is decomposed into the entities shown in Table 5. 
We have used net asset values for most entities. This reflects approximate matching of 
assets and liabilities in the case of DMO and RBNZ, and for the SOEs reflects the fact that 
they manage their assets and liabilities as an integrated business. We have modeled the 
assets and liabilities of ACC and the GSF separately. The net assets of smaller entities 
are grouped for modeling simplicity.  
We have eliminated intra-Crown cross-holdings so that values for each entity may be 
different from those reported by entities. For example, whilst the EQC manages about $5 
billion in assets, much of this is in government bonds. This is an internal transaction for 
the Crown which has no bearing on the aggregate risk exposure to the Crown’s net worth. 
Thus, in the model, the capital associated with EQC is only about $2 billion.  
Values for primary revenue and expenditure are based on accrual measurement (which is 
only an approximation of cash flows) with growth rates determined by using the 2009 
Long-term Fiscal Statement and applying a nominal annual discount rate of 10%. The 
choice of discount rate is largely arbitrary, although we note that this rate is consistent 
with estimates of the social opportunity cost of capital (New Zealand Treasury, 2008). 
Expected returns and volatility 
For each asset and liability class in the model, the expected return and volatility 
assumptions are set out in Table 14 (annual simple returns).  The general approach for 
the different types of conventional assets and liabilities is set out in Table 12. The 
assumptions for the primary balance settings are discussed in more detail below.  
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Table 12 – Approach to estimating expected returns and volatilities for ordinary 
assets and liabilities 
Entity type  Description of approach 
DMO and RBNZ  The expected returns are set equal to the current yield on 5-year government bonds. 
Volatility is estimated based on the standard deviation of total returns on an index of 
New Zealand government bonds over 1996 to 2009.  
SOEs  Expected returns are modeled to be equal to the cost of equity which is estimated to be 
10% (Macquarie, 2008). Volatility is estimated based on the market volatility of equity in 
similar enterprises. All SOEs are assumed to have the same return characteristics, 
which is a modeling simplification. 
Crown financial institutions 
(CFIs) 
Return and volatility assumptions are estimated based on portfolio compositions. These 
have been adjusted to reflect that some CFIs hold some of their portfolios in the form of 
government bonds, holdings of which are eliminated because they are an intra-Crown 
transactions.  
Government departments 
and Crown entities 
(excluding DMO, RBNZ 
and Crown financial 
institutions) 
Most assets managed by government departments and Crown entities are property, 
plant and equipment. Expected returns and volatility have been estimated by looking at 
the historic return and volatility of a New Zealand commercial property index. For 
estimates of risk which exclude these social assets, the financial assets of government 
departments and Crown entities are assumed to have the same return characteristics as 
government bonds. 
ACC liability and GSF 
liability  
Expected returns are assumed to be the same as for government bonds. Volatility is 
assumed to be higher than for government bonds to reflect additional risks attributable to 
demographics and cost uncertainties. 
Student loans  The expected return is based on an effective interest rate, which is used to impute the 
asset value. Volatility is assumed to be equal to that of government bonds. 
Because of the relatively large size of primary revenue and expenditure components in 
the model, their return and volatility parameters are very important to the model’s results. 
The primary balance is not a conventional asset or liability and does not have ‘returns’ in 
the conventional sense, but instead future expected revenue and spending increases are 
determined using the Treasury’s long-term fiscal projections.  
The model does not have any mean-reversion assumed and therefore the modeled 
volatility should be thought of as the permanent component of changes in taxes and 
spending. Thus what is needed is an estimate of forecast error in the structural level of 
primary revenue and expenditure, holding policy settings constant.  
Keene and Thomson (2005) analyse tax forecasting errors by the Treasury. Their analysis 
focuses on the one-year-ahead forecasts. They adjust for policy change. Their key finding 
was that tax revenue errors had a standard deviation of 3.2%. This is likely to have some 
error attributable to non-permanent effects, which would overstate error. On the other 
hand, forecasting tax revenue over the longer term would be expected to be subject to 
greater uncertainty. 
Treasury’s projections of GDP may also be useful as an indicator. We looked  at 
projections for real GDP in the Budget Economic and Fiscal Updates over 2003 to 2009.  
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The standard deviation to the annual change in projections for real GDP was 2.4% and the 
standard deviation in the difference to the most up-to-date projection was 3.1% (looking at 
projections for the 2020 fiscal year where all variables are at trend levels). Tax revenues 
would tend to be more volatile than GDP, so this might understate revenue volatility. 
There is a literature on estimating output gaps in real time.  A US study found volatility in 
simulated revisions to output gap estimates to be in the range of 1.5% to 3.5%, depending on 
the different filtering techniques (Orphanides and van Norden, 2002). A New Zealand study 
(Graff, 2004) estimated much smaller errors, with average absolute deviations of 0.9% for 15 
quarters over 1997 to 2000. These studies are likely to represent a lower bound on the 
uncertainty of future tax revenues because they only analyse uncertainty in real time.  
Based on this evidence (limited as it is), we chose a value for the annual volatility of 3.0% 
for primary revenue and 1.5% for primary expenditure. The latter is no more than an 
educated guess based on the intuition that volatility in expenditure, holding policy 
constant, is likely to be smaller than the volatility of tax revenue. 
Net capital injections 
We assume that SOEs pay dividends of 4.5% of their pre-dividend equity value, reflecting 
the average over the past eight years. Crown financial institutions do not receive capital 
injections, which is a simplification and reflects the temporary suspension of contributions 
to the NZSF. Other assets are assumed to have a net capital injection of 2% per annum, 
reflecting new capital expenditure and advances, but this is only an approximation. 
Correlations 
Correlations are estimated using historical time series of monthly returns. Sample 
correlations between each time series are computed with equal weight placed on each 
observation.  A list of the datasets is shown in Table 13. The correlation coefficients used 
in the model are given in Table 15. The length of the time series is relatively short – 
around 40 quarters.  
In some cases, the same dataset is used to proxy the returns of more than one asset or 
liability class in the model. This has two consequences. First, where two classes have the 
same dataset used to proxy returns, we have had to use our judgement for the correlation 
between them. We did this based on what we considered to be economically plausible 
relationships. The second consequence of this approach is that there is no guarantee of 
generating a valid correlation matrix (which must have the mathematical property of being 
positive semi-definite).  In order to generate a positive semi-definite correlation matrix, we 
used an algorithm developed in Higham (2002), which finds the closest valid correlation 
matrix to the ‘invalid’ one. This algorithm finds a valid correlation matrix which for practical 
purposes is very close to the original specification.  
A critical correlation coefficient is that between primary revenue and primary expenditure. No 
reliable data was available because of the endogeneity to policy choice. There is suggestive 
evidence in the Treasury’s Long-term Fiscal Model. Here, primary revenue and expenditure 
are positively correlated because higher economy-wide labour productivity affects both tax 
revenue and expenditures on New Zealand Superannuation payments and the public-sector 
wage bill of existing programmes. In that model, a 1% change in tax revenues due to labour 
productivity variability is associated with a 0.6% change in primary expenditures, holding 
policy constant.  Other factors can effect affect tax and not spending (or vice versa), such as 
changes in labour participation. We chose as a correlation parameter the value of 0.5.  
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Table 13 – Time series datasets for determining correlations 
Entity Dataset  Period   
Primary revenue  Treasury’s projections for real GDP (for 2020 fiscal year)  2003-2009 
Primary expenditure  Treasury’s projections for real GDP (for 2020 fiscal year)  2003-2009 
Debt Management Office  ANZ New Zealand Government Bond Index  1996-2009 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand  ANZ New Zealand Government Bond Index  1996-2009 
New Zealand Railways 
Corporation  NZX property index  1997-2009 
Meridian Energy  NZX energy index  1997-2009 
Mighty River Power  NZX energy index  1997-2009 
Landcorp Farming   NZX property index  1997-2009 
Genesis Power   NZX energy index  1997-2009 
Transpower New Zealand  NZX energy index  1997-2009 
New Zealand Post  NZX finance index  1997-2009 
Other SOEs  NZX midcap index  1997-2009 
Air New Zealand  NZX transport index  1997-2009 
New Zealand Railways 
Corporation  NZX property index  1997-2009 
NZSF  NZSF actual returns  2003-2009 
EQC  EQC actual returns  2004-2009 
ACC assets  ACC actual returns  2001-2009 
GSF assets  GSF actual returns  2002-2009 
ACC liability  ANZ New Zealand Government Bond Index  1996-2009 
GSF liability  ANZ New Zealand Government Bond Index  1996-2009 
New Zealand Transport Agency  NZX property index  1997-2009 
Ministry of Education/Schools  NZX property index  1997-2009 
Housing New Zealand  NZX property index  1997-2009 
District Health Boards  NZX property index  1997-2009 
Student loans  ANZ New Zealand Government Bond Index  1996-2009 
Other  NZX property index  1997-2009 
US dollar–denominated debt  Total return index for United States Government Bonds with 










































































Table 14 – Return, volatility and capital injection assumptions 
   Asset (if applicable)  Liability (if applicable) 
   Expected return  Volatility  Net capital injection  Expected return  Volatility  Net capital injection 
Primary balance  N/A  3.0%  N/A  N/A  1.5%  N/A 
DMO  N/A   N/A    N/A  5.5%  4.0%  Residual 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand  5.5%  4.0%  0.0%  N/A   N/A  N/A   
New Zealand Super Fund  6.6%  10.0%  0.0%  N/A  N/A  N/A   
Accident Compensation Corporation  8.0%  15.0%  0.0%  5.5%  6.0%  0.0% 
Earthquake Commission  8.0%  15.0%  0.0%  N/A  N/A  N/A   
GSF  6.6%  10.0%  0.0%  5.5%  5.0%  0.0% 
New Zealand Railways  7.0%  12.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Meridian Energy  10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Mighty River Power  10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Landcorp Farming  10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Genesis Power  10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Transpower New Zealand   10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
New Zealand Post   10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Other SOEs  10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Air New Zealand  10.0%  20.0%  -4.5%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
New Zealand Transport Agency  7.0%  12.0%  2.0%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Housing New Zealand   7.0%  12.0%  2.0%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Ministry of Education/Schools  7.0%  12.0%  2.0%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
District Health Boards  7.0%  12.0%  2.0%  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Student loans  7.0%  4.0%  2.0%  N/A  N/A   N/A 
Other  7.0%  12.0%  2.0%  N/A  N/A   N/A 
 










































































Table 15  – Correlation assumptions 
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Primary revenue  1.0                                  
RBNZ  0.1  1.0                               
NZSF  0.2  -0.5  1.0                            
ACC  0.1  0.0  0.6  1.0                         
Earthquake Commission  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.8  1.0                      
GSF  0.1  -0.4  0.9  0.7  0.4  1.0                   
New Zealand Railways  0.1  -0.2  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.6  1.0                
Meridian Energy  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  1.0             
Mighty River Power  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  1.0          
Landcorp Farming  0.1  -0.2  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  1.0       
Genesis Power  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.0    
Transpower New Zealand  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.8  1.0 
New Zealand Post  0.0  -0.4  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Other SOEs  0.1  -0.4  0.9  0.7  0.4  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7 
Air New Zealand  -0.2  -0.2  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3 
New Zealand Transport  0.1  -0.2  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Housing New Zealand   0.1  -0.2  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Ministry of Education/Schools  0.1  -0.2  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7 
District Health Boards  0.1  -0.2  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Student loans  0.1  0.5  -0.5  0.0  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
Other  0.1  -0.2  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Primary expenditure  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
DMO (unhedged debt)  0.1  0.8  -0.5  0.0  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
ACC liability  0.1  0.5  -0.5  0.0  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
GSF liability  0.1  0.5  -0.5  0.0  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
                         


































































































loans  Other 
Primary 





Primary revenue                                        
RBNZ                                        
NZSF                                        
ACC                                        
Earthquake Commission                                        
GSF                                        
New Zealand Railways                                        
Meridian Energy                                        
Mighty River Power                                        
Landcorp Farming                                        
Genesis Power                                        
Transpower New Zealand                                        
New Zealand Post  1.0                                     
Other SOEs  0.8  1.0                                  
Air New Zealand  0.4  0.6  1.0                               
New Zealand Transport  0.5  0.7  0.4  1.0                            
Housing New Zealand   0.5  0.7  0.4  0.5  1.0                         
Ministry of Education/Schools  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.8  1.0                      
District Health Boards  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.8  1.0                   
Student loans  -0.4  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  1.0                
Other  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.8  -0.2  1.0             
Primary expenditure  0.0  0.1  -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.0          
DMO (unhedged debt)  -0.4  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.5  -0.2  0.1  1.0       
ACC liability  -0.4  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.5  -0.2  0.1  0.5  1.0    
GSF liability  -0.4  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.5  -0.2  0.1  0.5  0.5  1.0 
 
US dollar–denominated debt  -0.3  -0.4  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  0.5  -0.4  -0.1  0.5  0.5  0.5 
 